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Abstract 
 In 2001, the federal government introduced the Affordable Housing Initiative as a means 
of stimulating the increased production of affordable housing. This represented its first significant 
commitment to affordable housing construction since its exit from the housing sector in the early 
1990s. The program involved an investment of over $1 billion spread over 5 years. In Ontario, 
over $364 million was directed towards the production of rental and supportive housing, of which 
Toronto received some $79 million. This has resulted in the construction of some 1,135 new 
affordable rental units in Toronto.   
This paper considered the on the ground impacts of the Affordable Housing Initiative on 
the City of Toronto. In doing so, it examined the shifts in housing policy within Canada, and 
specifically Ontario with a focus on welfarism, neoliberalism and post-welfarism. A series of in-
depth interviews was conducted with key housing stakeholders within the housing sector 
including representatives of the City of Toronto, Toronto Community Housing, and housing 
advocates. This has allowed for a multifaceted analysis of the program’s impacts on affordable 
housing in the city.   
The findings suggest that despite the introduction of the Affordable Housing Initiative, 
Toronto’s affordable housing system has witnessed an increased reliance on the private sector, 
and the perpetuation of band-aid solutions. This has been a result of the federal government 
divesting itself of the burden of initiating and delivering social programs. Within the context of a 
post-welfare state that has been influenced by neoliberalism, this is an expected outcome. It is 
also noted, however, that housing policy at the local level has been subjected to provincial 
oversight by the Ontario Municipal Board. This serves to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism 
on land-use policies that are associated with the construction of affordable housing. Given the 
findings, the following recommendations are made: a) the senior levels of government commit to 
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a long-term, consistent and substantive funding program; b) the federal government adopt a more 
realistic interpretation of what is meant by affordable housing; and c) provincial oversight be 
maintained during the planning and construction of affordable housing.  
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1  Introduction 
a. Research Question 
There is a growing housing affordability crisis within the Toronto region that is much 
larger than that of any other Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) in Canada. When compared to 
Vancouver (15 per cent) and Montreal (12 per cent), Toronto had the highest percentage of 
households in core housing need at 17 per cent in 2007 (CMHC, 2010)1. These households tended 
to spend more than 30 per cent of their income on rent, and resided in housing that was 
inadequate in size and condition (CMHC, 2010; City of Toronto, 2009). This burgeoning crisis 
has been attributed to several factors, including senior level government inactivity on the issue of 
affordable housing.    
In Ontario, the senior levels of government have persistently cut their level of funding for 
affordable housing over the last 20 years. The most notable decrease occurred during the early 
1990s where the federal and provincial governments removed themselves from the housing 
sector. More specifically, affordable housing responsibilities including its on-going funding and 
management were downloaded onto municipalities. This has resulted in an exponential increase 
in municipal housing expenditures, rising from some $145 million in 1997 to over $1.5 billion in 
2008 (Statistics Canada, 2009) 2. In contrast, federal housing expenditures were restricted to about 
$2 billion annually between 1995 and 1997 (Fallis, 2010). During this same period, the province 
limited its funding to $42 million annually with $215 million directed towards one-time capital 
upgrades to existing housing (Graham & Phillips, 1998). According to Pomeroy (2007), these 
drastic cuts represented a decrease of almost $700 million from a peak of 4.1 billion in 1993. In 
both cases, there was no direct spending for the creation of new affordable rental units. Rather, 
                                                           
1 Refer to Appendix I for a graphical comparison of the incidence of core housing need within select 
CMAs.  
2 Refer to Appendix II for a graphical representation of Ontario municipalities’ current housing expenditure 
vs. federal and provincial specific purpose transfers, 1988-2008. It should be noted that the federal and 
provincial figures presented represent only transfers to municipalities. Consequently, they do not provide 
an account of the decrease in direct spending on affordable housing.   
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these funds were meant to maintain the existing affordable rental stock. This lack of funding has 
resulted in a drastic drop in the production of affordable rental units, averaging out to some 1000 
units being built annually between 1996 and 2001. This represented a significant decrease from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s of 20,000 units yearly (Shapcott, 2007).   
On a local level, cities such as Toronto have witnessed the intensification of an affordable 
housing crisis. More than 640,000 Torontonians including seniors, people with disabilities and 
recent immigrants, require some form of assistance in meeting their housing needs (City of 
Toronto, 2009). Of these, 216,000 households are in core housing need with some 66,000 
currently on the social housing waiting list (City of Toronto, 2011a & b).  
In an effort to address this crisis, the federal government introduced the Affordable 
Housing Initiative (AHI) in 2001. In many respects, the AHI was considered the federal 
government’s reengagement within the affordable housing sector since its exit during the early 
1990s. It is premised on providing grants to local level housing providers with the purpose of 
stimulating the increased production of affordable rental units. In Ontario, the AHI is operated 
under the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH) program. This is a multilateral 
agreement with the federal, provincial and municipal governments on a cost-matching basis of 
federal grants (CMHC, 2007).  
The research question that this paper seeks to explore is: in what ways has the 
reengagement of the federal government within the affordable housing sector, through the C-
OAH program, influenced the delivery of affordable housing in post-amalgamated Toronto? 
More specifically, I am interested in examining the on the ground effects of this program on the 
City of Toronto, a large urban center that is home to a burgeoning vulnerable population. 
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b. Theoretical Framework 
In exploring this research question, it is important to ground the analysis within a 
particular theoretical framework or lens. This, according to Stelman (2005) will assist in 
imposing a certain frame of reference on the reality that is being examined. The theoretical lenses 
chosen for this paper relate to neoliberalism and post-welfarism. In the broadest of views, 
neoliberalism refers to the retrenchment of government with an emphasis on ‘individual choice’ 
and the markets. Neoliberal policies are used by governments to deregulate and privatise 
government functions while reducing its size and control. It tends to promote fiscal conservatism 
through cost cutting measures rather than government spending (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006; 
Kiel, 2002).   
This is a useful framework for informing our discussion as it has been argued that the 
1990s may have well represented the peak of neoliberalism within Ontario (see Hackworth & 
Moriah, 2006; Kiel, 2002). The election of Mike Harris and the Progressive Conservatives under 
the banner of the Common Sense Revolution (CSR) saw the retrenchment of government. The 
CSR movement supported a shift towards a minimalist form of government, and a reliance on the 
market and private sector in providing and managing affordable housing (Hackworth & Moriah, 
2006).   
I have suggested that the 2000s, when the AHI was created, has witnessed a movement 
towards a post-welfare state that has been heavily influenced by neoliberal ideologies. As a result, 
it is important to examine how housing policy responses are framed at the senior levels of 
government, and how they are translated on the ground. Within the context of this paper, it was 
hypothesised that the emergence of the post-welfare state has resulted in the federal government 
placing fewer social expenditure burdens on itself. This in turn has resulted in a reliance on the 
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ground on non-governmental actors such as the private for-profit and non-profit sectors in social 
service delivery.    
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2  Case Selection and Research Methods 
In order to explore the proposed research question, a triangulated approach was used that 
involved an extensive literature review and in-depth interviews. This method is one that has been 
used within the housing studies literature, and has been subjected to rigorous peer-reviewed 
evaluations.   
a. Why study the City of Toronto? 
In examining the issue of affordable housing, the City of Toronto presented a unique case 
study within Ontario. The city has been facing a chronic affordable housing pandemic since the 
early 1990s. This has, arguably, been attributed to the rise of neoliberalism in Ontario (Keil, 
2002). For example, the total households in need of affordable housing have increased from some 
137,000 in 1991 to more than 216,000 in 2006, representing a 58 per cent increase (City of 
Toronto, 2011a). Many of these households are part of a burgeoning dependent population that is 
marginalised and ignored within the city. As suggested by Boudreau, Keil and Young (2009), this 
is due to the fact that the housing market has been dominated by the private sectors, which have 
tended to focus on the homeownership component rather than the rental market. In fact, from 
2000 to 2002, only 3 per cent of new housing construction in Toronto was for rental units 
compared to 97 per cent for the home-ownership market (City of Toronto, 2003). Consequently, 
the C-OAH program represented a pivotal initiative in addressing this chronic crisis. The premise 
of the program is to stimulate the production of affordable housing, which is targeted towards the 
rising dependent population. Also, given the fact that Toronto has been heavily influenced by 
neoliberal ideologies during the 1990s, I was able to examine its impacts on the post-welfare 
state. 
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b. Literature review 
A historical review of social housing policy in Canada was conducted with a focus on its 
policy shifts from welfarism to neoliberalism and most recently, post-welfarism.  The premise of 
this was to set the context within which affordable housing in Ontario evolved throughout the 
years. In doing so, an extensive review of recent studies, particularly within the last decade was 
consulted. This included a thorough review of scholarly journals, periodicals, government 
documents and publications from non-governmental organisations. Also, a literature review of the 
management of social housing in Ontario with key recommendations for housing policy reform 
was conducted. This was primarily used to inform the discussion and analyses of interview 
results. I further examined existing statistics gathered from Statistics Canada, ONPHA, the 
CMHC, and the City of Toronto’s Affordable Housing Office.  
c. Interviews 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the on the ground effects of the C-OAH 
program on the City of Toronto, I attempted to contact ten housing agencies representing various 
aspects of the housing sector. This included staff from the City of Toronto’s Affordable Housing 
Office, planners, the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), housing advocates, and 
non-profit and private sector organisations. However, only four respondents opted to participate 
in the study. These included two civil servants from the City of Toronto - a representative from 
the Affordable Housing Office and a senior planner from the Planning Department; a member 
from the TCHC; and a housing advocate from a well-known equity rights agency in Ontario.  
Given this relatively small sample size, I opted to conduct in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with respondents so as to gain a comprehensive analysis of the issue facing the city. 
The interview process lasted approximately one to two hours, and was premised on a series of 
hypotheses that were developed through the literature review process (refer to Section 4). 
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Specifically, I focused on the influences of neoliberalism on a post-welfare state. Much like 
Jinha’s (2009) approach, the interviews were initiated using a series of prepared questions with 
the purpose of engaging respondents in a meaningful manner. This included a review of their 
work in the housing sector, and their interactions with the C-OAH program. As the interview 
process continued, respondents were allowed to elaborate and highlight key aspects that they 
deemed to be critical to the program, while also addressing the research question. This allowed 
for a more exploratory approach to the interview process. It should be noted that interview texts 
were reported anonymously to protect informant identity.     
 In interpreting the results, interview notes were re-typed and organised into major themes 
based on the research question and hypotheses. In some cases, new and distinct categories were 
created as these issues were not initially considered during the literature review process. This 
included the influences of NIMBYism and the role of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB).  
d. Study strengths and limitations 
There are several advantages to having a triangulated approach. Firstly, by reviewing the 
evolution of housing policy, I was able to utilise a wide variety of data sources to gain an 
extensive understanding of the policy shifts in Ontario. This allowed for comparisons to be made 
over time with respect to the economic, political and social forces that have influenced affordable 
housing policy. More importantly, the data gathered was not affected by reactivity, further 
strengthening the analyses while complementing the interviews (Neuman & Robson, 2009).  
Secondly, the use of in-depth interviews allowed me to employ a microscopic approach 
to the research. That is, given the relatively small sample size, I was able to utilise a greater 
number of open-ended questions to support my analyses. These were semi-structured in nature, 
but allowed for free responses. This not only allowed respondents to answer questions in rich 
detail, but also enabled me to probe further in particular responses.  
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Thirdly, given the complex nature of the issue being explored, I was able to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of respondents’ thoughts and opinions into the program and its 
effects on the city. In essence, I was able to understand respondents’ reasoning behind their 
opinions. It also allowed for a critical evaluation of the program and the discovery of 
unanticipated findings, which were examined further (Neuman & Robson, 2009).  
Lastly, owing to the fact that I have elected to examine the C-OAH program after being 
introduced 10 years earlier, allowed for a more accurate analysis of the program. The results 
generated are by no means premature in nature, but rather, an accurate account of the impact of 
the program on the ground. It also allowed respondents to reflect on the program’s outputs and 
outcomes throughout the years (2001-2008).  
 Despite the apparent strengths, the research methods also had several limitations. The 
most notable include its relatively small sample size. Given that four out ten respondents agreed 
to participate, I was unable to obtain a broader understanding of the impacts of the C-OAH 
program. The sample is representative to a degree, but does not take into account the opinions of 
the private for-profit sectors. Also, given that I conducted a case analysis, the results obtained 
cannot be generalised across the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area.    
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3  Literature Review  
This section comprises of two main components: (a) definitions of key concepts and (b) a 
review of Canadian housing policy. I operationalised the notions of affordable and social housing, 
welfarism, neoliberalism, and post-welfarism as I used them in this paper. These concepts were 
used to inform my analyses of the proposed research question, and thus required much attention. 
Secondly, a literature review of Canadian housing policy has been conducted. Here, I examined 
the shifts in housing policy since the 1940s onwards with a focus on welfarism, neoliberalism and 
post-welfarism.  
a. Definitions 
Affordable Housing 
 There are many interpretations of what is meant by affordable housing. For example, 
from the perspective of the Canadian government (both federal and provincial), affordable 
housing refers to shelter that costs less than 30 per cent of a household’s before tax income 
(CMHC, 2010). Unfortunately, this definition is quite narrow and unrealistic, and only represents 
a small proportion of the population in need of housing that is adequate and suitable. More 
importantly, it views affordability as being a static concept that represents a single point in time.   
On the other hand, housing advocates such as the Ontario Non-Profit Housing 
Association (ONPHA) interpret affordable housing as being part of a continuum rather a single 
point. It ranges from vulnerable households in deep need, spending more than 50 per cent of their 
income on rent, to those who may be able to afford the 30 per cent norm, but may still experience 
housing need. These households may have a chronic need that requires continual support, or have 
no support needs but experience low income due to factors such as weak labour market skills 
(ONPHA, 2009). Consequently, affordable housing tends to mean different things to different 
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people at different times (ONPHA, 2009). It is this viewpoint that I agree with, and have used to 
inform my analyses.  
Social Housing 
 Social housing is used to describe all forms of publicly assisted housing. These include 
public, non-profit and co-op housing (Wolfe, 1998). The purpose of social housing is to provide 
assistance to low- and moderate-income households obtain shelter that is adequate, suitable and 
affordable. These include seniors, families, single parents, recent immigrants, and special needs 
groups. It can be provided by municipalities, voluntary groups and community organizations such 
as the YMCA/YWCA. A critical component to social housing is ensuring affordability. 
Welfarism  
 The social welfare state or welfarism can be thought of as a loose set of social policies 
and programs that provided Canadians with a modest level of economic security and social 
support (Mulvale, 2001). It was designed to address specific problems of the day relating to the 
production of goods and services and their distribution (Hulchanski, 2007). Also known as the 
Keynesian welfare state, it began during the mid-1940s and lasted until the mid-1970s. According 
to Fallis (2010), welfarism represented a new relationship between governments and their 
citizens. Governments were seen as having a legitimate role in ensuring the welfare of its society. 
In doing so, they were expected to mitigate the unequal distribution of income, wealth and 
opportunity that were present within the markets.   
Neoliberalism  
 Based on the literature surveyed, neoliberalism appears to be an elusive and highly 
contested term that is rife with internal contradictions and inconsistencies. As a result, there are 
countless viewpoints of how neoliberalism is defined and manifested locally. Nonetheless, it is a 
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useful concept in examining the evolution of social housing policy in Ontario, particularly during 
the 1990s. Within the context of this paper, I have elected to use Hayek (1944) and Friedman’s 
(1962) interpretation of what is meant by neoliberalism. They have suggested that neoliberalism 
is centered on three main ideas. Firstly, the individual is the normative center of society and 
should be as unencumbered by rules and collective responsibilities as possible. That is, their 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills should be liberated (Bouderau et. al., 2009). 
Secondly, the market is the most effective means through which individuals can maximise their 
own utility functions. Lastly, state actions that interfere with either individual autonomy or 
market relations lead to an autocratic society. In other words, the markets should be free from 
state and bureaucratic controls (Bouderau et. al., 2009).  
Neoliberalism therefore, can be viewed as a set of ideologies that promote the private 
interests through deregulation, privatisation, liberalisation of the markets, and downsizing of 
governments (Harvey, 2000). It has also been known to support the draconian cut-backs in the 
welfare state, most notably in social services including housing. In essence, it is a belief that 
guides the actions of governments. However, it is important to note that neoliberalism must be 
viewed as being part of a situation-contingent application that is influenced by specific economic 
structures, political culture and history (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). These influences will 
determine the specific policies that will manifest themselves on the ground. Neoliberalism must 
not be viewed as being part of a top-down process whereby the decisions of the senior levels of 
government directly influence the on the ground impacts. Rather, the decisions of government 
coupled with locally contingent realisations will influence how neoliberalism is manifested.  
There are mainly two phases to neoliberalism: “roll-back” followed by “roll-out”. 
According to Peck and Tickell, (2002) and Hackworth and Moriah (2006), “roll-back” 
neoliberalism refers to the dismantling and deregulation of the Keynesian state policies including 
public housing and public spaces. The second phase, formally known as “roll-out” neoliberalism, 
12 
 
 
refers to the creation of new institutions and regulations of the state that promote neoliberal 
ideologies.  
Post-Welfarism 
 Post-welfarism or the post-welfare state is a relatively new model that is emerging in 
North America and across Europe. It is thought to have emerged after the rise of neoliberalism 
during the early 1990s. Much like the welfare state, post-welfarism seeks to pursue the same 
fundamental objectives of social policy (Fallis, 2010). This includes deploying social programs as 
the first line of defence against economic insecurity, not the last (Battle & Torjman, 2001). 
However, post-welfarism recognises that governments alone cannot address issues of social 
policy. That is, governments are not playing a major role in alleviating the inequities of the 
markets. Rather, post-welfarism emphasises the need and importance of non-governmental actors 
such non-profit and for-profit organisations in designing and delivering social programs (Battle & 
Torjman, 2001). It also stresses the importance of adapting to the changing economic, political 
and social realities within which governments must operate.  
In many respects, the post-welfare state appears to have been heavily influenced by the 
“roll-out” phase of neoliberalism. That is, much of its policies and programs appear to have 
perpetuated the ideologies of neoliberalism. For example, apart from its emphasis on partnerships 
with the private and voluntary sectors, it also seeks to reduce the size of governments. According 
to Battle and Torjman (2001), this has been done through the reduction in duplication and overlap 
within and between governments, particularly between the federal and provincial levels and their 
delivery of social programs.  
b. Canadian Housing Policy 
The history of Canadian housing policy is quite complex. However, an understanding of 
it is necessary in exploring the impacts of the C-OAH program on the City of Toronto. It will not 
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only serve to contextualise ones understanding, but also shape the discussion to follow. In doing 
so, I have elected to use George Fallis’ (2010) approach of dividing the history of housing policy 
into four periods: 1945-1964, 1964-1978, 1978-1998, and 1998 to 2008. This allowed me to 
categorise the evolution of housing into three main stages: welfarism, neoliberalism and post-
welfarism. As suggested by Fallis (2010), the financial crisis of 2008 and its subsequent recession 
represent another period of housing policy, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The first period of Canadian housing policy extended from 1945 to 1964, and is formally 
known as the era of economic development (Leone & Carroll, 2010). During this time, the federal 
government took a leading role in housing policy development. It was primarily focused on 
transitioning out of a wartime economy into a period of stabilisation (Fallis, 2010). In doing so, 
the federal government was interested in stimulating the growth and development of new housing 
for war veterans, operationalising the private mortgage market, and building new dwellings to 
overcome the backlog from the depression and war (Fallis, 2010). This period also saw the 
creation of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), later renamed the Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation. This was a crown entity that was focused on providing 
mortgage insurance and direct lending to returning war veterans and private developers. At this 
point, the market was heavily focused on homeownership and the rise of suburban development. 
For example, grants and loans were supplied by the federal government for the suburban 
development of large-scale, medium-density housing (Carroll, 2002). According to Fallis (2010), 
there was only a very small public housing program with no comprehensive housing policy in 
place.   
The second period, 1964 to 1978, represented a marked shift towards a comprehensive 
housing policy in Canada. It can be classified as the era of social development. It began with the 
National Housing Amendments (NHA), which saw the entrance of the provincial governments 
into the housing sector (Leone & Carroll, 2010). This led to a series of cost sharing and direct 
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subsidy programs for many housing initiatives. It also led to the creation of the short-lived 
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, which has been credited for facilitating housing policies 
involving all three levels of government. For example, home-ownership assistance programs, 
housing for seniors, and income-integrated housing were all developed in cooperation with the 
three levels of government (Carroll, 2002). This period also saw the widespread support for the 
construction and ongoing funding of public housing. In fact, by 1970, over 10 per cent of housing 
starts were public housing, which was targeted towards low-income households (Fallis, 2010). 
Recipients of public housing were charged a rent geared to their income that required deep 
ongoing subsidies from both the federal and provincial levels of government.  
This period also led to the creation of non-profit and co-op housing programs. These were 
operated by a third sector, formally known as the non-profit housing sector. This form of housing 
relied heavily on cost-sharing funding and on-going subsidies from the CMHC and the provinces 
(Fallis, 2010). In most cases, the funding mechanisms were based on 75:25 per cent cost 
matching basis. That is, 75 per cent federal grants and 25 per cent provincial funds, with the 
provinces requiring 10 per cent from municipalities (Wolfe, 1998). These programs were 
developed with the intention of achieving social mixing within public housing. This was a rising 
concern for many housing advocates during this era. 
According to Leone and Carroll (2010), this phase led to the rise of the welfare state in 
Canada, particularly in regards to housing policy. The goal of this period was to solve social 
policy problems through rational problem-solving techniques that involved the introduction of 
broader social-liberal discourses. Here, it was thought that people could be assisted in obtaining 
better housing through expanding government funded housing initiatives. Governments were seen 
as having a legitimate role in improving the welfare of its residents. Consequently, Canada was 
moving towards a comprehensive housing policy with over 20,000 new social housing units being 
constructed annually (Fallis, 2010).  
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The 1978 to 1998 period, formally classified as the era of contraction, began with 
concerns over rising government deficits, sluggish economic growth and increasing 
unemployment (Leone & Carroll, 2010; Wolfe, 1998; Flavo, 2006). During this period, the 
federal government was finding it difficult to sustain many of the social programs created during 
the welfare state. As Fallis (2010) suggested, this led many policy makers into believing that the 
welfare state had expanded too far, thereby becoming a drag on the economy. The net effect of 
this was the cancellation of many federally sponsored housing programs, and a transition from a 
strong federally controlled sector to that of a weak, almost non-existent one (Leone & Carroll, 
2010). In effect, the federal government was disentangling itself from public housing. In many 
ways, they wanted to reduce the overlap and duplication between federal and provincial 
jurisdictions (Leone & Carroll, 2010). During the earlier part of this period, the CMHC no longer 
provided mortgage loans to non-profit and co-op housing providers in financing the construction 
of new units. Rather, these groups were required to secure mortgages through the private markets 
(Fallis, 2010). However, they still continued to issue mortgage insurance to these organisations.  
By 1994, the federal government had removed itself completely from the funding and 
management of housing. As a result, housing responsibilities were downloaded onto the 
provincial governments. As Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) and Schuk (2009) have argued, 
downloading refers to the process through which the authority, responsibility and resources for 
certain services are downloaded from one level of government to another.  In terms of 
expenditure, prior to 1994, the federal government had pledged approximately $2.13 billion for 
housing; in 1995/96 and 1996/97, these figured dropped to $2.03 and $1.94 billion respectively 
(Leone & Carroll, 2010). These cuts were crippling to the management and creation of affordable 
housing initiatives in Canada, and specifically Ontario.  
In Ontario, the issue was further compounded with the provincial election of Mike Harris 
under a CSR manifesto in 1995. One of his main platforms was to reduce the overlap and 
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duplication within and between governments – much like that of the federal government. This led 
to the divestment and disengagement of the provincial government from the governing and 
financing of social housing (Graham & Phillips, 1998). In this case, housing responsibilities were 
further downloaded on municipalities. In doing so, Ontario cancelled all future housing 
commitments and eliminated support for roughly 17,000 units that were already in the pipeline 
(Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). To further exacerbate the problem, the province did not grant 
municipalities any additional revenue generating authority. This, according to Schuk (2009) and 
Hackworth and Moriah (2006) limited their ability to address the needs of the community, as they 
did not have enough taxing authority to generate sufficient revenues for such expenditure. They 
were forced to operate and deliver additional social services using their existing tax base, much of 
which has been shrinking. 
Upon the province’s exit, they agreed to a one-time investment of $215 million in capital 
upgrades, $173 million to repair co-op housing and $42 million annually for public housing 
(Graham & Phillips, 1998). Even though these may be construed as being significant investments, 
municipalities were still unable to meet the rising demand for affordable housing, further 
intensifying the existing housing crisis. For example, the Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association 
(ONPHA) (2011) has noted that Ontario’s social housing waiting list has been steadily increasing 
since 2004. There are currently 152,077 households on the waiting list, representing an increase 
of over 21 per cent since 2004 (126,103).  
The 1978 to 1998 era thus ultimately led to the rise of neoliberalism within the housing 
policy sector, particularly within Ontario. The 1990s have been thought to represent the peak of 
neoliberalism and the drastic “roll back” of welfare state policies. As Dalton (2009) suggested, 
the inability of the welfare state to deal with changing economic conditions, particularly high and 
persistent rates of inflation and employment, established a shift in thinking. It is this context that 
gave rise to the ideologies of neoliberalism. This era, specifically with regards to the CSR 
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movement has been thought of as a way of privatizing as much services as possible, especially 
within the housing sector (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006; Kipfer and Keil, 2002; Keil, 2002).  The 
provincial government at the time believed that the markets would be able to solve the growing 
housing crisis while it occupied a more limited role. The intent of which was to improve the 
delivery of housing and forge new relationships with the private markets. 
 The final phase of housing policy, as defined within this paper, began in 1998 and ended 
in 2008. It can be categorised as the era of federal reengagement. According to Fallis (2010), this 
period signalled a shift in the economy to one of economic growth, low inflation and 
unemployment, and reduced government deficit. These shifts allowed for the development of new 
opportunities and initiatives within the housing sector. More importantly, the severity and 
visibility of the growing housing crisis during the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with growing 
pressures from municipalities and advocates propelled the issue of housing onto the federal 
government’s agenda (Fallis, 2010; Leone & Carroll, 2010).  
During this period, two unique programs were created by the federal government. Firstly, 
in 1999, they launched the Supporting Community Partnership Initiative (SCPI) with the goal of 
addressing homelessness. According to Flavo (2007), since 2000, the SCPI has provided 
approximately $850 million in funding for “strategic investments that address homelessness”.  
Secondly, in 2001, the federal government introduced the Affordable Housing Initiative 
(AHI), which represented their first significant commitment since the 1990s. This was based on a 
multilateral agreement with the federal, provincial and municipal governments on a cost-
matching basis of federal grants. These costs can be matched by any level of government or the 
private sector (CMHC, 2011). Under this initiative, the federal government has decided to 
decentralise decision making as to where federal monies can be spent to the provinces, 
municipalities and, arguably, the private sectors (Leone & Carroll, 2010). That is, municipal 
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service managers have been given granted the authority in determining the types of affordable 
housing projects that are eligible for funding without federal oversight. Housing proponents from 
the private and non-profit sectors can apply for funding from the service managers. This 
represented a significant shift from previous eras, where the federal level took more of a 
leadership role in the management of funds. During its first phase (2001), the federal government 
committed $680 million towards rental housing, which was to be spent over five years. In 2003, 
they contributed another $320 million for the funding of affordable housing for targeted low-
income households, resulting in a total of $1 billion (Leone & Carroll, 2010; Flavo, 2007). In 
2005, an additional $1.6 billion was pledged by the federal government for the provision of 
affordable housing (Flavo, 2007). However, this was not part of the AHI and was therefore not 
considered within this paper.  
 This period represented the emergence of a post-welfare state that has been heavily 
influenced by the neoliberal ideologies of the 1990s. To a large extent, it can be classified as the 
“roll-out” phase within the neoliberal regime that sought to create new regulations and 
institutions. For example, the AHI’s decentralisation of decision making as to how federal monies 
can be spent appears to have further allowed for an affordable housing sector that is heavily 
reliant on the private sector. The AHI also recognises the importance of partnerships with the 
private for-profit and non-profit sectors in addressing the issue of affordable housing. It is this 
shift that I was interested in examining, particularly with regards to its impact on the City of 
Toronto.   
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Table 1: Canadian housing policy stages 
 Policy Stages (focus on Ontario) 
Characteristics Economic development Social development Contraction Reengagement 
Time 1945-1964 1964-1978 
1978-1998 
1998-2008 
1978-1994 1994-1998 
Intergovernmental Federal leadership Multi-level governance consultation 
Provincial 
leadership 
Municipal 
leadership  Tri-level consultation 
Delivery instruments Federal loans and grants Cost sharing and direct subsidies and loans 
Loan guarantees, 
mortgage 
insurances and 
coproduction 
Non-profit and 
for-profit 
sectors, local 
governments  
Cost sharing between 
governments and the 
private sector 
Economic conditions Reconstruction and prosperity Prosperity and inflation 
Recession and high government 
deficits 
Economic growth and 
high government 
surpluses 
Policy framework Beginning of the welfare state The welfare state Neoliberalism 
Emergence of post 
welfare state 
 
 
Source: Carroll & Leone, 2010; Fallis, 2010 
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4  Hypotheses 
In exploring the proposed research question, a series of hypotheses were developed. 
These were informed through the theoretical frameworks outlined earlier including neoliberalism 
and post-welfarism. These hypotheses were used as a means of teasing out possible questions to 
be considered during the interview process. It also served to guide the discussion and analyses.  
Based on the review of the literature, the following have been suggested: 
1. The post-welfare state recognised the importance of partnerships with non-governmental 
actors. As such, the C-OAH program has allowed for greater flexibility in enticing non-
profit and private sector organisations in participating within the process of developing 
new affordable housing. Within the context of this paper, the term private sector refers to 
for-profit organisations such as private developers.  
2. The retrenchment of governments within the housing sector during the 1978-1998 era 
precipitated a reliance on private sector involvement in providing affordable housing. 
Consequently, the proceeding period, which the C-OAH program was created, has further 
continued to perpetuate this reliance on private sector involvement. That is, the program’s 
successful operation is dependent on its ability to engage the private sector.   
3. The post-welfare state places fewer burdens on governments, particularly at the senior 
levels, in delivering affordable housing. Therefore, the intention of the C-OAH program 
is to divest the federal government of the burden of initiating and delivering new 
affordable housing programs. They are more interested in supporting limited programmes 
of capital assistance rather than addressing the root causes of the affordable housing crisis 
plaguing many urban centers such as Toronto.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into two sections. First, I discussed the broad setup 
and structure of the C-OAH program. This included its objective, program components, funding 
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allocations and responsibilities of municipal service managers. Next, I examined the detailed 
findings based on the triangulation of interviews and documentary data from Toronto.  
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5  Overview of the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH) Program 
In Ontario, the AHI is operated under the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing (C-OAH) 
program (refer to figure 1). The main objective of this program is to increase the supply of 
affordable housing in Ontario through partnerships with all levels of government and housing 
stakeholders. This includes private and non-profit housing providers such as co-ops, service 
clubs, religious and charitable organisations, and municipal non-profits (MMAH, 2006). There 
are four main components to the program: housing allowance/rent supplements, rental and 
supportive housing, northern housing and homeownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Affordable Housing 
Initiative (AHI) Framework 
Canada-Ontario Affordable 
Housing (C-OAH) Program 
Agreement 
Housing 
allowance/rent 
supplements 
Rental and 
supportive 
housing 
Northern 
Housing 
Northern 
Housing 
Cost-shared Programs Cost-matched Programs 
Federal $ Ontario $ Unilateral Ontario $ 
Municipal Service 
Managers deliver program 
Figure 1: Overall Structure of the AHI program 
Source: CMHC, 2007 
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Within the context of this paper, I examined the rental and supportive housing 
component, which is primarily focused on providing financial assistance to non-profit and private 
developers. It required a total of $364 million in federal and provincial contributions, representing 
the largest share of the four components (see table 2). The program has created some 5,440 units 
across Ontario (City of Toronto, 2006). Within the City of Toronto, over $79 million have been 
allocated towards the creation of new affordable rental housing under the program. This has 
resulted in creation of some 1,135 affordable rental units (see table 3). The rental and supportive 
housing component is therefore a significant aspect of the C-OAH program as it generated the 
most affordable units of the various components.  
Table 2: Program funding and unit allocation (Ontario) 
Program component Units Total Funding Funding per unit Progress  (as of 2006) 
Housing 
allowance/rent 
supplements 
5,000 $80M 
$20 - $360/month 
 
Average $266/month 
499 units 
Rental and supportive 
housing 
4,000 rental $280M 
Average $70,000 5,440 units 1,200 supportive $84M 
Northern housing 1,500 $30M Average $20,000 200 units 
Homeownership 4,500 $36M Average $6,500  to $10,000 884 units 
Total 16,200 $510M  7,023 units 
 
Table 3: Program funding and unit allocation (City of Toronto) 
Program component Units Total funding 
Housing allowance/rent supplements 1,800 $37.80 
Rental and supportive housing 1,135 $79.45 
Homeownership 729 $6.345 
Total 3,664 $123.595 
 
According to the MMAH (2006), the rental and supportive component aims to reduce the 
capital costs for rental and supportive housing units developed through new construction, 
Source: MMAH, 2006; City of Toronto, 2006 
Source: MMAH, 2006; City of Toronto, 2006 
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acquisition and conversion, or through additions and renovations to existing stock. It also enables 
housing providers to achieve rent levels that are below average market rents for a minimum of 20 
years. In fact, rents are required to be at or below 80 per cent of CMHC’s Average Market Rent 
(AMR). For example, in 2006, the AMR for the City of Toronto was $1,061. Under the C-OAH 
program, housing providers would be required to charge a maximum monthly rent of $849 
(Government of Ontario, 2006). The program is primarily targeted towards the vulnerable 
populations including Aboriginal peoples; recent immigrants; persons with disabilities; persons 
living with mental illness; low-income seniors; victims of violence; and the working poor. 
As indicated in table 2, the average combined federal and provincial contribution per 
affordable rental unit is $70,000. Of this, 38 per cent or $26,600 is provided by the federal 
government as up-front capital, which is available during the development and construction phase 
of projects. The remaining 62 per cent or $43,400 is provided by the Government of Ontario, 
which is used to finance the 20 year minimum affordability payment (MMAH, 2006). Funding 
from this initiative is provided on a five year renewal basis. An important caveat to the program is 
the requirement that housing projects be “shovel ready” within three months of being approved 
by Municipal Service Managers.   
In operating the program, the role of the municipality, through Ontario’s 47 Consolidated 
Municipal Service Managers, is to (MMAH, 2006): 
a) plan and facilitate local affordable housing investments with local partners;  
b) ensure the appropriate target groups and clients are assisted by programs; 
c) provide appropriate development incentives to support proponents participating in the 
program including waiving development charges or equalisation of property taxes;  
d) establish local procurement processes including soliciting and selecting eligible 
projects and/or households to the province; and 
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e) ensure program compliance and reporting, especially in regards to the 20 year 
affordability period 
Service managers therefore play a critical role in ensuring that the program is successful in 
achieving its objective. As illustrated in figure 1, they are the ones responsible for implementing 
and operating the program on a local level. According to the MMAH (2006), service managers 
are in the best position to build partnerships within the community that address local needs.  
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6  Findings and Discussion   
In discussing my findings, I have elected to categorise the results into three recurring 
themes that became apparent during the interview process. These included having a reliance on 
private sector involvement; the perpetuation of band-aid solutions; and the influences of 
NIMBYism and the role of the OMB. Within each category, I have attempted to address the 
issues brought forth within the hypotheses suggested.  
a. Reliance on private sector involvement 
The reengagement of the federal level within the social housing sector has increased the 
reliance on private sector involvement for the provision of affordable housing in post-
amalgamated Toronto. This has been attributed to the senior level governments’ exit from the 
housing sector during the early 1990s. More specifically, the draconian cuts that followed their 
exit forced many housing experts to abandon the sector in search of alternative employment, 
ultimately rendering the sector inoperable (TCHC, 2011; City Staff 1, 2011).   
When the federal government introduced the C-OAH program in 2001, the City found 
itself at a crossroads. Since they lacked the necessary skills and expertise needed within the 
housing field, they were required to partner with private sector housing developers (City Staff 1, 
2011). The reason being that they possessed the necessary efficiencies and capabilities required to 
stimulate the production of affordable rental units (City Staff 2, 2011). They had the initial capital 
investments required to get projects “shovel ready” within three months from being approved, 
which was a prerequisite for funding. In comparison, non-profit housing providers lacked the 
necessary capacities required to meet this three month rule, ultimately making it difficult for them 
to qualify for funding. Many non-profits did not have the initial capital investment required to get 
projects started. For this reason, both the city and province favoured increasing partnerships with 
private developers (TCHC, 2011). In fact, during the procurement process, the city staffs have 
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been found to favour private sector housing projects over those from non-profit housing providers 
(City Staff 1, 2011). For example, upon proponents (both private and non-profit sectors) 
submitting their housing proposal, city staff were required to determine which projects had a 
greater likelihood of being approved by Service Mangers. In doing so, staff tended to overlook 
many non-profit housing proposals as it was felt that they could not meet the program’s 
prerequisites (City Staff 1, 2011).  
This preference for private sector involvement can also be traced to many provincial and 
city led initiatives. This includes the Municipal Housing Facility by-law and reduced property 
taxes, both of which were granted under the amendments to the Municipal Act in 2001. From a 
provincial perspective, this allowed for greater flexibility in attracting private sector interests to 
the sector. On a local level, these initiatives were used as a means of enticing private sector 
developers in entering into partnerships with the city. The Municipal Housing Facility by-law, 
enacted in 2002, provides loans and/or grants to the private sector in the form of waived 
municipal development charges for the provision of affordable housing (City of Toronto, 2002). 
The city also provides tax incentives to private developers who receive C-OAH program funding. 
For example, multi-residential properties can qualify for a residential property tax rate, which is 
substantially lower.  This further entices private developers to participate within the program. For 
example, within the City of Toronto, the current city tax rate for residential properties (excluding 
the education tax rate) is 0.56 per cent, while the multi-residential tax rate is pegged at 1.86 per 
cent, resulting in a difference of 1.30 per cent (City of Toronto, 2011c). While these programs 
may be construed as ensuring the affordability of units, its primary goals has been to attract 
private sector developers. It should be noted that these incentives are applicable to both private 
and non-profit sectors. However, it has been more successful in garnering private sector approval 
given the potential financial gains.  
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Another interesting finding relates to the fact that much like the city, non-profit housing 
providers including the TCHC, have been found to rely on private sector involvement. In the case 
of the TCHC, they are heavily reliant on private sector involvement, particularly during the 
construction phases (TCHC, 2011). According to the TCHC respondent interviewed (2011), the 
organisation cannot provide new affordable units without partnering with the private sector. That 
is, they must always contract out projects to private developers. This is due to the fact that they, 
much like the city, lack the necessary expertise required for the construction of new units. In 
attracting developers to the process, the TCHC has agreed to facilitate the planning approval 
process including development applications, official plan and zoning by-law amendments and 
consultations, while the developer is solely responsible for the construction of units (TCHC, 
2011).      
The TCHC has also been involved in fostering public-private partnerships that favour the 
private sector. This a cooperative venture that is undertaken with the involvement of private and 
public sectors that builds on the expertise of each partner (CCPPP, 2009; Moskalyk, 2008; 
Wallace et al., 1998). A recent example of this type of partnership is the revitalisation of 
Toronto’s Regent Park, located in east downtown Toronto. While the revitalisation did not create 
additional affordable rental units, it is still a useful case to examine since the project involved a 
$1 billion reinvestment, over half of which was covered by private capital and funding from the 
C-OAH program.  The redevelopment is one that utilized a public-private partnership agreement 
among all three levels of government, the TCHC, and Daniels Corporation, which is a private 
developer. The TCHC’s interest in public-private partnerships has been partially guided by the 
principles of the CSR movement. That is, there is an increased reliance on the market, rather than 
governments in providing affordable housing to residents. As suggested by the housing advocate 
interviewed (2011), public-private partnerships are seen as a means of obtaining funding as 
governments are not injecting a sufficient amount of funds into the sector. This demonstrates the 
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fact that market-based logics are being utilised within the City of Toronto and its municipally 
operated housing provider. 
Despite the perceived successfulness of entering into partnerships with the private sector, 
several disadvantages have been identified. The most notable includes having a fragmented 
housing sector whereby specific areas within the city are given more attention than others 
(Advocate, 2011). For example, the successful engagement of the private-sector in the 
revitalisation of Regent Park is, arguably, attributed to its strategic location within the City of 
Toronto; it is situated just south of Cabbagetown in east downtown Toronto. Cabbagetown, once 
considered a ‘slum’, has since been successfully gentrified into an urban place that attracts 
professionals and urbanites. As James (2010) has noted, many critics to the revitalisation of 
Regent Park have citied that the entrance of a private developer was a means of facilitating the 
gentrification of the neighbourhood, much like that of Cabbagetown.  
 In this regard, there has been little effort in attracting the private-sector to participate in 
similar ventures across the city. The case that stands out is the Jane-Finch neighbourhood of north 
Toronto. Similar to Regent Park, this neighbourhood consists of a large-scale production of 
public housing (Boudreau et. al., 2009). It also comprises of a comparable demographic to that of 
Regent Park and has been branded as being plagued by poverty, crime and violence. The only 
major difference between Regent Park and Jane-Finch is their spatial location within the city. The 
Jane-Finch neighbourhood is not strategically located within the downtown core, nor is it in an 
area that can attract a varied socio-demographic populace. In these instances, it quickly becomes 
apparent that attracting private developers will depend on whether or not they perceive the 
venture as being a profitable one. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the C-OAH program is heavily reliant on private sector 
involvement and partnerships does not come as a surprise. Rather, it is an expected outcome as 
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the post-welfare state has been heavily influenced by the shifts in economic and political culture 
during the 1990s. It does, after all, represent the “roll out” phase of the neoliberalism. These were 
premised on dismantling the welfare state gains of the 1970s, thereby reducing the size of 
governments and liberalising the markets. Much of the literature surveyed have suggested that 
these policies, particularly with regards to the CSR movement, have led to the marketisation of 
many social services such as affordable housing (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006; Kipfer and Keil, 
2002; Keil, 2002). The fact that the C-OAH program emphasizes the need and reliance for private 
sector involvement in delivering the program suggests that there is real reliance on them. There is 
an acknowledgement that governments alone cannot address the issue of housing affordability.  
b. The perpetuation of band-aid solutions 
Another theme that emerged during discussions with respondents is the fact that the C-
OAH program has led to the perpetuation of band-aid solutions within the City of Toronto. That 
is, there is a tendency to provide temporary solutions that do not address the root causes of the 
affordable housing crisis. As suggested by respondents, this has been a result of several factors 
including a narrow definition of what is considered affordable housing, and providing episodic 
funding that is based primarily on population rather than need. These have limited the city’s 
ability in creating long-term comprehensive housing policies and initiatives (City Staff 1, 2011; 
TCHC, 2011; Advocate, 2011). 
The notion of affordable housing is quite elusive. It can mean different things to different 
people at different times. According to the MMAH (2006), affordable housing within the context 
of the C-OAH program is defined as dwellings that cost less than 30 per cent of a household’s 
before-tax income. This definition is quite vague and unrepresentative of the crisis being faced 
within Toronto. It appears as though there is a disconnect between what the senior levels of 
government define as affordable and what is happening on the ground (Advocate, 2011). Their 
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definition is unrealistic and fails to take into consideration those who may be in core housing 
need, spending more than 30 per cent of their income on rent (Advocate, 2011). These individuals 
may be in a chronic state of core housing need, requiring on-going rent supplements. For 
example, according to the City of Toronto (2011a), in 2006, over 23 per cent or 216,070 
households spent more than 30 per cent of their income on rent within Toronto. Of these, 70 per 
cent or 154,190 households were renters. Under the C-OAH’s mandate, it is unlikely that these 
households will be able to benefit substantially from the program (Advocate, 2011).  
 As suggested from discussions with interviewees, the federal government’s use of this 
definition was a result of them wanting an interpretation that required limited funding, and could 
be reached through the initial capital subsidies provided (Advocate, 2011). That is, an initial 
subsidy to the construction of affordable rental units is small compared to on-going shelter 
allowances required to maintain realistic affordable rents. The result of this is that housing 
providers cannot maintain rents at below market levels, but rather, must go below economic rents. 
However, such an approach barely meets any definition of affordability (TCHC, 2011). In fact, 
Dalton (2009) and Pomeroy (2003) have noted that the federal government has maintained a 
position of not entering into any new initiatives that involve on-going subsidies. Rather, they are 
only prepared to enter into a limited programme of capital assistance for additional public 
housing. This places fewer burdens on governments and allows them to put relatively minimal 
resources into developing new units (Advocate, 2011). Within the context of a post-welfare state, 
this is an expected outcome as there are fewer burdens placed on governments in addressing 
social inequities (Battle & Torjman, 2001). They have limited their responsibility to the provision 
of capital investments, transferring all other responsibilities onto municipalities, and arguably, the 
private sector.     
 Another aspect to this is the reliance on episodic funding that is based on the size of a 
city’s population rather than its population need for affordable housing (Advocate, 2011; City 
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Staff 1, 2011). Within the City of Toronto, this is a particularly pressing issue as it limits their 
ability to address the core issue of housing affordability, which is providing on-going rent 
supplements to households in core need. As demonstrated within tables 4 and 5, while Toronto 
received the largest “chunk” of C-OAH program funding ($79M) resulting in some 1,135 units, 
this was not sufficient in addressing the city’s needs. That is, of the 154,190 renting households in 
need, only 1,135 have been able to gain access to affordable rental units. This represents a mere 
0.7 per cent of the total renting population (see table 6). To further exacerbate the problem, this 
does not include the 66,000 currently on the social housing waiting list. When compared to the 
regional municipalities of Durham, Halton and York, 1.5 per cent, 1.8 per cent and 1.4 per cent 
respectively were able to access affordable rental units. Despite these relatively small 
percentages, one is able to clearly identify the disconnect between housing need and the funding 
being provided. In many respects, Toronto has not been able to receive an equitable portion of 
federal funding when compared to other municipalities within the GTA. The federal government 
has chosen to ignore the fact that the Toronto is home to a burgeoning vulnerable population that 
is much larger than that of any other municipality within the GTAH and Ontario. By virtue of 
this, they require a substantial amount of federal government investments.    
Table 4: GTA rental and supportive housing funding and unit allocation 
Regional Municipalities Funding (M) Units 
City of Toronto $79.45 1,135 
Regional Municipality of Peel $32.55 465 
Regional Municipality of Durham $11.20 160 
Regional Municipality of Halton $8.40 120 
Regional Municipality of York $25.90 370 
Subtotal GTA $157.50 2,250 
  
 
 
Source: MMAH, 2006 
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Table 5: Central Ontario (exc. GTA) rental and supportive housing funding and unit allocation 
Regional Municipalities Funding (M) Units 
County of Simcoe $10.85 155 
County of Dufferin $1.05 15 
City of Hamilton $15.40 220 
District Municipality of Muskoka $1.75 25 
Regional Municipality of Niagara $7.70 110 
Subtotal Central exc. GTA $36.75 525 
 
Table 6: Percentage of renting household accessing C-OAH program funded rental units 
Regional Municipality Renters in housing need 
Units from  
C-OAH program 
Per cent being 
housed 
City of Toronto 154,190 1135 0.7% 
Regional Municipality of Durham 11,025 160 1.5% 
Regional Municipality of Halton 6,500 120 1.8% 
Regional Municipality of  York 25,730 370 1.4% 
 
Coupled with this is the issue of having episodic funding that continues to diminish 
throughout the years. Federal grants are disbursed in five years “chunks”, which limits most 
municipalities, particularly the City of Toronto from having a long-term sustainable housing 
strategy. For example, the city’s affordable housing action plan for 2010-2012, formally known 
as the Housing Opportunities Toronto (HOT) plan, is dependent on a long-term financing plan 
from the federal and provincial governments. This plan proposes 67 actions within eight strategic 
themes that are directed towards to the provision of affordable housing within Toronto3. As per 
the plan, $484 million in annual investments are needed over the next 10 years to assist 257,700 
                                                           
3 As per the Affordable Housing Action Plan, the eight strategic themes guiding the 67 actions for 
affordable housing includes: 
1. Creating housing opportunities in all neighbourhoods 
2. Helping homeless and vulnerable people find and keep homes 
3. Assisting individuals and families to afford rents 
4. Preserving and repairing rental housing 
5. Revitalizing neighbourhoods 
6. Creating new affordable rental homes 
7. Helping people to buy and stay in their homes 
8. Working together 
Source: City of Toronto, 2011 
Source: MMAH, 2006 
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households struggling with high housing costs or inadequate accommodations (City of Toronto, 
2009). Despite the city’s repeated attempts of obtaining such a long-term investment strategy, 
they have been unsuccessful. According to the City Staff 1 (2011), this is one of the main issues 
grappling the city as there no way of predicting whether the federal government will renew its C-
OAH program funding commitments. It is this uncertainty that makes it difficult to plan for the 
long-term.  
The other aspect to the problem is the fact that the funding levels are constantly 
decreasing and changing as the program progresses. As illustrated in figure 2, funding has begun 
to decline at a rapid pace since 2008 and will need to be replaced. For example, in 2008, the city 
lost $570,000 in federal funding, and in 2009, it lost a further $1,082,405 (City of Toronto, 2007). 
By 2015, it is expected to decrease by an additional $31,000,000 annually. These cuts are a result 
of the federal government electing not to reinvest funds from expiring federal social housing 
agreements back into social housing (City of Toronto, 2007). By doing so, the viability of 
existing affordable housing within Toronto is at risk of being lost. The city’s tax base is the only 
source of on-going revenue for housing, which makes it difficult to sustain. It is not an 
appropriate mechanism for funding social housing.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Withdrawal of federal funding for social housing in the City of Toronto, 2001-2029 
Source: City of Toronto, 2007 
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There appears to be a limited reengagement of the federal level within the social housing 
sector. On the ground, the C-OAH program has made little impact on the City of Toronto’s 
affordable housing crisis. The program places fewer burdens on the federal and provincial 
governments in delivering affordable housing. Their insufficient level of funding has only led to 
the perpetuation of band-aid solutions that do not address the issue of core housing need. Based 
on the findings, it is suggested that the federal government is only interested in solving some 
immediate concerns rather than addressing the root causes of housing affordability.     
c. The Influences of NIMBYism and the Importance of the OMB 
The management of social housing at the municipal level is complex to say the least. 
Apart from the absence of appropriate funding, social housing decision making is also influenced 
by local political forces that derive from NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard). This has been 
particularly evident within land-use planning in Toronto, and is in fact, a major barrier to the 
provision of affordable housing. Specifically, the influences of NIMBYism on the planning 
process have been found to contribute to the continued opposition of affordable housing within 
particular communities. For example, during the start of 2010, councillors were faced with a 
controversial proposal to legalise rooming houses across Toronto. These are considered a form of 
affordable housing for low-income persons and workers (Kwan, 2010). The purpose of this 
proposal was to harmonise the rules to make rooming houses legal in areas such as Scarborough, 
which would stimulate further developments (Kwan, 2010). However, many Scarborough 
councillors opposed the proposal, stating that their constituents did not want these types of 
housing located within their community. In fact, many suggested that they were a “threat to 
single-family homes and the community’s character” (Kwan, 2010). According to the OHRC 
(2011), these discriminatory neighbourhood opposition that is, NIMBYism creates a formidable 
land-use barrier to building affordable housing projects. These negative attitudes tend to delay, 
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halt or restrict many affordable housing developments within Toronto. More importantly 
NIMBYism heavily influences local political forces, as demonstrated within the case.  
With the reengagement of the federal level, Toronto has witnessed a snail’s pace of 
affordable housing development. Nonetheless, these developments tend to garner strong resident 
oppositions within communities, pushing the production of affordable housing into certain parts 
of the city (Advocate, 2011). This is especially true for non-profit housing organisations such as 
service clubs, religious groups and charitable organisations as they are often times directed 
towards a particular demographic within communities. This tends to lead to neighbourhood 
opposition among residents (Advocate, 2011). In this regard, the OMB has been an influential 
body in mediating potential conflicts. The OMB is an independent administrative tribunal 
responsible for hearing appeals and deciding on various contentious municipal matters including 
land-use planning issues (MMAH, 2010). In terms of land-use matters, the OMB must base its 
decision on sound land use planning principles as set forth within the Planning Act and Provincial 
Policy Statements (PPS). Within the City of Toronto, the OMB has been successful in driving 
affordable housing production in areas that may oppose its development (Advocate, 2011). As 
suggested by Moore (2010), while the OMB may erode local politicians’ decision making 
authority, it allows them (local politicians) to evade responsibility for unpopular decisions. They 
are not influenced by NIMBYism or political will, but rather, by the planning principles set forth.  
The OMB has also been found to negatively influence the decision making process within 
Toronto. As indicated by City Staff 1 (2011), the fact that planning applications involving 
affordable housing could end up at the OMB drastically influences the selection of projects. 
Proposals that are brought to the OMB are time consuming and expensive for the city and 
developers. Consequently, in selecting affordable housing projects, city staffs have developed a 
scoring process that reviews the likelihood of applications ending up at the OMB (City Staff 1, 
2011). In doing so, they neglect projects that require substantial amendments to the official plan 
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and zoning by-laws, and those that may be perceived as being contentious – garnering 
neighbourhood opposition. This tends to shortlist many applicants during the approvals process, 
ignoring projects that may be of value to particular neighbourhoods within the city. 
Unfortunately, the city has taken a complacent role where they are guided by proposals that are 
more likely to be approved, rather than those that are deemed vital to communities. The 
reengagement of the federal level therefore, has allowed for the further intervention of a 
provincial body within the affordable housing sector that has significant influences on the types 
of decisions being made at the local level. It should be noted that the federal level’s reengagement 
did not precipitate the OMB’s involvement, but rather, increased the need for provincial 
oversight. Their role is to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism on land-use policies that are 
associated with the construction of affordable housing. However, while they support sound 
planning decisions, they can negatively influence the ways in which local decisions are made in 
the selection of affordable housing projects.  
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7  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the reengagement of the federal level within the affordable housing sector 
has significantly influenced the ways in which affordable housing is delivered within the City of 
Toronto. More specifically, the C-OAH program has further increased the reliance on private 
sector involvement, and has continued to perpetuate band-aid solutions that fail to address the 
affordable housing crisis plaguing the city. This has been attributed to the federal government 
placing fewer burdens on themselves. It has refused to develop new housing initiatives, and have 
limited its involvement to only providing initial capital investments to creating affordable 
housing. There is no long-term, consistent and substantive funding mechanism in place to 
sustaining housing in Toronto.  
So, despite the C-OAH program representing the federal government’s first significant 
commitment since the 1990s, its involvement has been limited in many ways. It appears as 
though the neoliberal ideologies of the 1990s have begun to influence the ways in which 
affordable housing is managed within the post-welfare state. There is an acknowledgement that 
governments alone, particularly the senior levels, cannot address issues of social need. Rather, 
there is a dependence on non-governmental actors, most notably the private sector in designing 
and delivering social programs to citizens. This should not come as a surprise as the dismantling 
of the affordable housing net during the 1990s crippled many parts of the sector, rendering it 
inoperable. Much of the skills and expertise required were lost during this period and has not yet 
resurfaced.  
The findings also suggest that housing policy at the local level is subjected to provincial 
oversight through the OMB. This serves to attenuate the influences of NIMBYism on land-use 
policies that are associated with the construction of affordable housing. This is a result of local 
decision making being highly susceptible to political forces that are fuelled by NIMBYism. These 
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forces can act in ways that limit the production of affordable housing within certain parts of the 
city. As such, there must be a mechanism in place, in this case the OMB, which is not easily 
influenced by external forces. Rather, their decisions must be guided by policies that promote 
good planning within the city such as an Official Plan.    
While the premise of this paper was to examine the influences of the C-OAH program on 
the City of Toronto, it has also demonstrated the importance of senior level government 
commitments within a post-welfare state. Housing policy at the local level cannot thrive without 
some form of government intervention. The 1990s has clearly demonstrated the impacts of taking 
such an approach. That is, the market alone is not the best mechanism for allocating goods and 
services as it does not take into consideration issues of equity. Rather, housing policies are 
dependent on a long-term commitment from governments including funding, and some form of 
oversight.  
On a final note, it is important to acknowledge that the housing policy landscape within 
Toronto is rapidly evolving with the continued emergence of the post-welfare state. This paper 
has merely scratched the surface of the longer term impacts of having the federal government 
reengaged within the sector, albeit limited. This paper does suggest that the affordable housing 
crisis is still alive and continues to plague the city.     
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8  Recommendations 
Based on the analysis undertaken, several recommendations have been brought forth. 
These include: 
1. Lobbying the federal and provincial governments to committing to a long-term, 
consistent and substantive funding agreement for the City of Toronto. This includes the 
provision of on-going rent subsidies to households in need. As demonstrated, simply 
providing capital grants for affordable housing do not address the core issues of 
affordability.  
2.  Expanding the federal government’s interpretation of affordable housing. Currently, the 
definition used is unrealistic and vague. This is largely due to the fact that they view 
affordability as being a static point, rather than as a continuum. In doing so, they will be 
better able to respond to crisis plaguing many urban cities.   
3. Ensuring that there is continued provincial oversight in the development and management 
of affordable housing. Decisions at the local level can be easily influenced by residents 
and other stakeholder groups. Consequently, there must be some type of mechanism to 
ensuring that sound planning decisions are being made. 
4. Creating better opportunities for genuine non-profit sector involvement. This includes 
modifying program requirements such as the “shovel ready” rule as a means of attracting 
and facilitating non-profit sector involvement. This sector has faced the burnt force of the 
draconian cutbacks during the 1990s and continues to struggle within the sector. 
Governments must acknowledge that this sector plays a vital role in development 
affordable housing in many vulnerable communities.  
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9  Further Research 
In moving ahead, the research conducted has raised additional questions that would 
benefit from further study. More specifically, it is recommended that interview component of the 
paper be expanded to include a wider range of stakeholders. These might include for-profit 
organisations, religious and charitable groups and community institutions. In doing so, one would 
be able to obtain a broader perspective on the influences of the federal government’s 
reengagement within the social housing sector on Toronto. This would allow one to examine the 
particular challenges involved in engaging the non-profit sectors as they have been unable to 
maintain their expertise within the field.  
Secondly, it might be useful to compare and contrast the impacts of the C-OAH program 
on municipalities across the Greater Toronto Area. As funding is based primarily on population, it 
would of interest to examine its effects and influences, particularly in regards to the reliance of 
the private sector. In doing so, the researcher must acknowledge that the City of Toronto is a 
unique case analysis as it home to over 2.5 million residents. The political, social and economic 
forces driving the city will be different from other cities within the GTA.   
Lastly, a critical component that could be researched further pertains to the role of the 
OMB in facilitating the development of affordable housing within the City of Toronto. In this 
regard, it would be of great interest to examine the amount of cases brought forth to the OMB in 
regards to affordable housing issues and their proceeding decisions. This is a particularly 
important field to consider since the OMB has been found to play a major role in the development 
industry within Toronto.  
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Advocate: Center for Equality Rights in Accommodation Representative 
City Staff 1:  City of Toronto, Affordable Housing Office Representative 
City Staff 2:  City of Toronto, City Planning Department Representative 
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Appendix I 
Table 7: Incidence of core housing need within select CMAs, 2002-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentage (%) 
CMA 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Halifax 14.9 13.3 13.6 10.2 15 12.2 
Montreal 13.2 13.4 12.1 14 13.8 12.3 
Quebec 8.7 7.5 8.9 8.7 8 8.1 
Ottawa-Gatineau 12.4 15 13.7 13.9 14 10.4 
Toronto 18.5 17.8 19.1 18.9 17.6 17.2 
Winnipeg 9.2 8.7 9.9 10 10.4 10.4 
Saskatoon 12 10.9 9.8 11.8 13.3 9.6 
Calgary 11.8 12.3 8.8 7.3 9.6 10.6 
Edmonton 12 10.6 11.3 9.6 8.3 10.4 
Vancouver 19.4 18.1 17.4 15 17 15.2 
Urban Canada 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.5 13.1 12.4 
Source: CMHC, 2010 
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Appendix II 
        Figure 1: Ontario municipalities’ current housing expenditure vs. federal and provincial specific purpose transfers, 1988-2008 
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